In an opinion piece for Defence Connect, Chris Rule — general manager of defence at GME — argues that the newly released 2025-26 Australian Signals Directorate Annual Cyber Threat Report should be read as a warning that Australia’s critical infrastructure is not ready for the cyber threats now aimed at it.
According to Rule, the report paints a stark picture of Australia’s cyber landscape, noting a 20 per cent increase in cyber security incidents. More alarmingly, he writes, the report explicitly advises critical infrastructure entities to be prepared to isolate systems and networks for up to three months. For organisations operating Australia’s essential manufacturing, energy and water sectors, Rule says, this is not just a theoretical warning — it is a clear signal that traditional IT security paradigms are failing to protect operational technology environments.
Rule argues that as the pace and sophistication of cyber threats grow, relying on perimeter firewalls and reactive patching is no longer sufficient. To maintain continuous operation and protect the critical services Australians rely on, he says, defenders must rethink their posture and look towards hardware-enforced network segmentation.
The threat, in Rule’s account, is accelerating because artificial intelligence is drastically reducing the skill barrier and time required for attackers to execute sophisticated campaigns. The barriers to devastating cyber attacks are rapidly falling, he writes, escalating the risk to essential services from a theoretical possibility to an immediate reality. These threats are not just targeting IT networks and data repositories, he warns; they are moving directly towards the physical systems that run infrastructure, with joint advisories from global agencies warning that adversaries are actively deploying AI-generated scripts to target programmable logic controllers in critical infrastructure.
The financial and operational impacts are surging alongside this shift, Rule writes. Cyber crime reports are now coming in every six minutes, and the burden falls particularly heavily on the mid-market, with medium businesses alone seeing a 45 per cent increase in the average cost of cyber crime to $141,300.
Keeping essential systems secure is particularly challenging when updates can disrupt operations, Rule argues. He cites a warning from Anthropic’s deputy chief information security officer of an impending “vulnerability tsunami”, estimating that critical infrastructure operators will face immense pressure over the next 18 months due to a critical lack of time to patch systems. When attackers can exploit vulnerabilities faster than organisations can deploy software updates, he writes, the traditional IT security model fails operational technology environments completely, because patching often requires taking critical systems offline, running extensive compatibility tests and managing unacceptable downtime.
If organisations cannot patch fast enough, Rule contends, the only reliable defence is physical network isolation. Separating operational technology environments from IT and internet-facing networks is the most effective way to eliminate the attack vector entirely, he writes, and this aligns directly with the ASD’s explicit recommendation that critical infrastructure entities be prepared to isolate their systems.
To implement effective network isolation without blinding the business to operational data, Rule says organisations must embrace “secure by design” products and hardware-enforced segmentation. Solutions such as unidirectional gateways and data diodes, he writes, offer a structural defence that software alone cannot provide: a data diode enforces strict, one-way data transfer at the hardware level, ensuring essential operational data flows out of the operational environment for monitoring, alerting and AI analytics while mathematically guaranteeing that nothing can travel back into the protected network.
To determine whether their perimeters are truly resilient, Rule says security leaders must urgently audit their environments by asking three crucial questions: are any programmable logic controllers reachable from the internet, is there any path from the cloud back into operational technology, and is the outbound data flow genuinely one-way?
Rule closes by arguing that implementing these advanced physical network controls requires trusted, sovereign capability to minimise supply chain vulnerabilities and ensure accountability. Local manufacturing and trusted providers, he writes, play a critical role in ensuring the continuous operation of Australia’s critical infrastructure during a crisis. He points to GME’s 65-year Australian heritage and its strategic partnership with Owl Cyber Defense, which he says gives Australian critical infrastructure access to accredited, world-leading hardware-enforced isolation solutions — a combination, in his words, that lets organisations confidently protect interconnected systems, maintain operational continuity and meet the ASD’s rigorous resilience standards. Establishing unbreachable boundaries between digital workflows and physical operations, he concludes, is no longer optional — it is a sovereign imperative.
Note: this is an opinion piece by Chris Rule, general manager of defence at GME, a company whose partnership with Owl Cyber Defense supplies the hardware-enforced isolation products the article recommends. The views and recommendations are the author’s.
