Washington DC Midair Crash Probe Finds Helicopter Was Flying Above Altitude Limit with Faulty Readings
An investigation into the January midair collision between a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter and an American Airlines passenger jet—resulting in 67 deaths—has revealed that the helicopter was flying higher than permitted and relying on inaccurate altitude data at the time of the crash.
During the first day of hearings held by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in Washington, chaired by Jennifer Homendy, investigators presented video reconstructions and audio recordings from the night of the accident near Ronald Reagan National Airport. They also began examining the roles of both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Army in what has become the deadliest U.S. aviation disaster since 2001.
According to investigators, the Black Hawk exceeded the 200-foot altitude restriction on its designated route along the Potomac River, climbing 80 to 100 feet higher than indicated by its barometric altimeter. Tests on other helicopters from the same Army unit revealed similar discrepancies, suggesting a systemic issue with the aging altimeter systems on the older Black Hawk models, originally designed in the 1970s.
Sikorsky Aircraft’s Dan Cooper noted that these helicopters lack modern air data computers, which newer aircraft use to provide more precise altitude information. Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the board that such a discrepancy between radar and barometric altimeters wouldn’t typically raise concern, as pilots are trained to cross-check both instruments—especially at low altitudes.
Still, Army and FAA officials acknowledged that the margin for error in that airspace is dangerously narrow. “Less than 500 feet of vertical separation is a concern,” said Scott Rosengren, chief engineer overseeing Army utility helicopters. He added that, if given the choice, he would replace all older Black Hawk models immediately.
Another major concern raised was the air traffic control procedures at Reagan National. Army pilots and medevac helicopter operators told the board they believed controllers typically held helicopters outside of active runway paths. But that assumption failed on the night of the crash. Audio from the control tower showed a single controller managing multiple aircraft, including two helicopters, three planes, and a medevac chopper, during the critical two minutes before the collision. Limited radio communication between helicopters and planes led to “stepped on transmissions”—messages lost due to overlapping signals.
Surveillance footage showed the collision and explosion as the helicopter intersected the plane’s path. The investigation also highlighted the use of night vision goggles by the helicopter crew, which narrowed their field of view and may have contributed to the tragedy.
The NTSB has also drawn attention to the FAA’s failure to act on years of warnings: 85 near misses had been reported near Reagan National prior to the crash. Investigators found that Army helicopters frequently flew in the region with key location-transmitting equipment—known as ADS-B Out—turned off, further compromising safety.
In response, U.S. Senator Ted Cruz has introduced legislation requiring all aircraft, including military ones, to use both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In technology. The latter allows aircraft to receive real-time location data from nearby aircraft, significantly improving situational awareness. The bill would also remove a long-standing exemption for Department of Defense aircraft.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy endorsed the proposal, calling it “the right approach” and criticized the previous administration for failing to address the region’s ongoing air safety risks.
The NTSB’s final report is expected next year, but Wednesday’s hearing made clear that systemic failures in technology, procedure, and oversight contributed to the crash.
